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Abstract 
 
It is well established that China has emerged as a major economic power, resulting from 
the nation’s neoliberal modernisation. What is less understood is the socio-cultural and 
educational impact of this change on public institutions. This article focuses on the 
education system, which is currently seen as central to delivering the nation’s 
modernisation project, particularly through suzhi jiaoyu (education for quality). More 
specifically, we engage with a pervasive public discourse of a boy crisis. We suggest the 
need critically to explore the local (national) meanings within a contemporary Chinese 
context of this assumed projected crisis that appears to be established as a western 
phenomenon.  We argue that the discourse of a boy crisis can be read as a strategic move 
to re-inscribe an earlier discourse, that of the boy preference, that in turn is discursively 
linked to nation building at a time of globally-inflected socio-economic transformations. 
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Introduction 
 
The last few decades in China has witnessed a remarkable discursive shift.  Traditionally, 
a notion of boy preference has had a major cultural impact on the behaviour and 
sensibility of the population, experienced as an exclusive discourse in society’s relation to 
boys.  Currently, the discourse of a boy crisis is circulating in the public domain and most 
visibly across mainstream and social media, with the suggestion that it is displacing a boy 
preference (Sun et al., 2010).  While the former tended to be domestically located, the 
latter is increasingly located within education.  For example, social research (Li & Zhao, 
2010; Chao et al., 2015) has particularly focused on education, highlighting the wider 
society’s anxiety that ‘boys are becoming more girly’. Recent spectacular media accounts 
of ‘feminised boys’ are resonant of a projected US/UK/Australian concern about the war 
on boys (Sommers, 2000; Haywood et al., 2015). The discourse of a boy crisis is 
particularly salient at a time when China is undergoing deep social-economic 
transformations with an emphasis on enhancing the quality of the whole population, with 
suzhi jiaoyu (education for quality) becoming a major concept of education reform.   
 
Studies of boys, masculinities and education are at an early stage in China.  A major issue 
is how we respond to the complexity of the discursive shift involving notions of boy 
preference and boy crisis.  Firstly, we suggest that the image of failing boys pervasively 
circulating in the public domain is derivatively borrowing from western neoliberal policy 
discourses about gender relations with a particular emphasis on selective descriptive 
narratives that have wide populist rhetorical appeal but little explanatory value.  
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Secondly, there are major problems with these media accounts, including that they write 
out girls as illegitimately over-achieving compared to boys, homogenise and overly 
psychologise boys and distract from the wide range of diverse social and cultural issues 
that different cohorts of boys experience in their schooling, including working class 
students in the context of the emerging new urban middle class and children of internal 
migrants (see Liang and Chen, 2007; Lin, 2013). Significantly, this article seeks to 
intervene in the discourse of a boy crisis that assumes boys’ experiences are universal 
(global application).  In response, we suggest the need critically to explore the local 
(national) meanings within a contemporary Chinese context of this assumed projected 
crisis.  We argue that currently the discourse of a boy crisis can be read as a way of re-
inscribing an earlier discourse, that of the boy preference tradition, that in turn is 
discursively linked to nation building at a time of globally-inflected socio-economic 
transformations. Our conceptual intervention through a socio-cultural and historical 
understanding of this discursive linking of the figure of the strong embodied boy with the 
strong modern nation has enabled us critically to engage with a notion of a boy crisis, 
located within a wider debate on the reconfiguring of gender relations in the current 
modernization era.  More specifically, we examine the particular institutional dynamics 
of how the discourse of a boy crisis operates within the context of contemporary 
neoliberal schooling, in which a crude dichotomy of under-preforming boys are being 
projected as being displaced by over-aspiring girls in terms of academic achievement that 
is pervasively circulated in the public domain. 
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The paper begins with an exploration of the playing out of neoliberalism at a local 
(national) level with reference to suzhi jiaoyu (education for quality) and the one child 
policy in tracing the discursive shift from boy preference to boy crisis.  It is followed by a 
direct focus on the linking of a boy crisis to a projected national crisis, in relation to the 
media’s claim of the de-masculinisation of education, which we are reading as an 
attempted re-inscription of the boy preference discourse.  Finally, we explore moving 
beyond western discursive frameworks, and in so doing reflecting on the media’s linking 
of the figure of the strong embodied boy and building the strong modern nation within 
neoliberal conditions of modernisation.  
 
 
Shifting discourses ‘from boy preference to boy crisis’: neoliberalism, suzhi jiaoyu 
(education for quality) and the one child policy  
 
Boy preference or son preference (Wang, 2005; Murphy et al., 2011) has been highly 
valued and deeply rooted in Chinese Confucian tradition. Within patriarchal agrarian 
society, boys were viewed as the future labour of the family1. Men for the outside, women 
for the inside was a typical description of a gendered division of work in traditional 
Chinese society (Fei, 2008). Alongside the economic rationale that privileged boys’ 
social position in the society, boys’ positions were strengthened when they became adult 
men through marriage and subsequently carried on the family name by having a child, 
preferably a boy. Such heteronormative and patriarchal gender norms were seen as key 
attributes of an adult man’s masculinity (Lin, 2013; Zheng, 2015). For a son, the biggest 
	  	   6	  
offense against fulfilling filial responsibility was not to have a kin-related heir (Lin, 
2013), while a daughter was metaphorically treated as splashed water that would be 
poured away and no longer belong to her parents’ family once she was married (Zhang, 
2009).  Until recently, the legacy of the logic of the discourse of a boy preference 
continued to have a major impact upon the gendering of parents’ response to their 
children’s education.  Due to his status as a permanent member of the family, a son and 
his parents maintained the financial and care taking relationships throughout their life 
course. Hence, parents’ investment in their sons’ education was also in their own self-
interest, ensuring that in return for their investment that they would be looked after when 
they were older (Murphy et al., 2011). Currently, equally of importance, investing in his 
education and cultivating him to become a human being is seen as an important step to 
realise the son’s masculinity, that contains moral responsibilities and interpersonal skills, 
as expressed in the concept of ‘zuo ren’ (to become a human being) (Ho and Wong’s, 
2006). 
 
We suggest that policy initiatives, such as suzhi jiaoyu and the one child policy, are the 
most central visible state changes which media commentators are interpreting as causal of 
the disappearance of the traditional boy preference, outlined above, with the suggested 
resulting emergence of a boy crisis.  
 
 
Suzhi jiaoyu (education for quality)   
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In tracking the apparent decline of the discourse of a boy preference, media 
commentators have particularly focussed upon the area of education, which is projected 
as an overly feminised institutionalised space that is de-masculinising boys.  This is 
occurring at the same time as education reform is officially intended to be a central 
strategy in delivering the nation’s neoliberal modernization project, its aspiration of 
development, modernization and a pathway to becoming competitive in the international 
arena. The primary aim is to develop the quality of the whole population. Suzhi education 
(suzhi jiaoyu, in Chinese: education for quality) has become a key concept in China’s 
educational reform, as explored by several writers.  For example, Dello-Iacovo 
(2009:242) argues that: ‘The ultimate goal of suzhi jiaoyu is national strength. The 
government has identified the skills China’s workforce needs to acquire which it sees as 
critical to sustaining its modernisation drive. Practical skills and innovative ability have 
been identified by the leadership as areas which need to be improved in order to raise 
China’s global competitiveness.’  For Anagnost (2004: 189-90), ‘in the movement from a 
planned to a market economy, the representation of value has undergone a reorganization 
in the realm of the biopolitical in which human life becomes a new frontier for capital 
accumulation. This changing relationship between value and bodies is encompassed by 
the term suzhi, which roughly translates into English as “quality.”’.  A major discussion 
among researchers critically engaging with the meaning of suzhi education is that it still 
advocates a yingshi approach (exam-oriented education) (Kipnis, 2011), even though 
initially suzhi education was aimed at trying to shift away from this traditional system to 
focus on the formation of the individual as an all-round, capable citizen.  
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Thus its effect is to promote a neoliberal self-governed subject by displaying quality of a 
capable citizen, with academic credentials seen as major attributes to demonstrate 
individual quality, which in turn, as suggested above, disproportionately effects a range 
of subordinately positioned boys, including working class students in the context of the 
emerging new urban middle class and children of internal migrants (Lin, 2013). As Mills 
and Keddie (2010: 411) argue within a western context, this move: ‘with its focus on 
individualization tends to attribute disproportionate blame on particular groups of boys, 
who already tend to be marginalised by race, ethnicity, class and sexuality’.  The 
discussion of individual performance or ‘biao xian’ (表现) in Chinese has been central in 
educational discourse regarding a boy crisis, that is, boys’ underperformance in contrast 
to girls’ overachievement is seen as illustrating the global phenomenon of a boy crisis, 
which as we suggest in this article can be read as an attempt to re-inscribe the Confucian-
based patriarchal discourse of a boy preference. 
 
China’s exam oriented education system has a long history that can be traced back to the 
imperial period, from the Sui Dynasty (581-618) through to the Qing Dynasty (1644-
1911)2. For example, the keju examination (civil service examination) illustrates how this 
method of assessing young people’s progress through school was highly valued by 
families in terms of their expectations and aspirations for their children, especially for 
boys. Importantly, the keju examination was regarded as a way to bring honour to the 
family and hometown, enabling social mobility, for example, the highly valued 
promotion to a government official.  In exploring the discourse of the boy preference, for 
men, if you could bring honour to the family, it was a way of fulfilling your filial piety 
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and thus demonstrating your masculinity (Lin, 2013).  What remains under-researched is 
a contemporary translation of suzhi education within the context of the reconfiguration of 
gender relations that makes sense to a younger generation and the emergence of new 
subjectivities among boys and girls at school operating within a neoliberal regulatory 
regime. 
 
 
The one-child policy 
 
The one child policy is another key social policy that has had a major impact on changing 
public understandings of gender relations and perhaps more implicitly unpinning the 
apparent decline in the traditional discourse of the boy preference. In the context of 
political economic transformations, a major policy development in recent Chinese history 
is changing legislation on the one-child policy during the late 1970s and early 1980s. The 
legislation shifted during that period, from rewarding families who had only one child to 
penalizing those who had more than one child (Banister, 1987). It restricted married 
couples to having only one child, thus challenging Mao’s political stance on population 
growth, as well as the traditional Chinese view of ‘more sons more prosperity’, which 
influenced many families to continue to give birth until a son was born (Yao and Tao, 
2015), thus having a profound effect on Chinese society.  
 
China’s one child policy was in line with rapid social and cultural transformations since 
its economic modernization in the late 1970s. However, recent research has suggested 
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that changing attitudes are taking place among urban parents towards boys’ and girls’ 
education, alongside the cultural legacy of the Confucian traditional son preference that is 
still central to Chinese culture. For example, Tsui and Rich’s (2002:74) study on urban 
parents’ attitudes to their only child’s educational success maintains that  ‘gender equality 
in education is an unintended consequence of the one-child-per-family policy and that 
under China's current social and economic conditions, girls are better off living in one-
child families in the big cities of modern China’.  Other studies suggest that boys’ 
educational success is valued as more important, compared to equally successful girls 
among the pre-one-child generation (Tsui and Rich, 2002). For example, Wang’ s (2005) 
study on ‘son preference and educational opportunities of children in China’ maintains 
that: ‘the continued son preference value, based on traditional views as well as on 
perceived financial returns to families, leads to a lower level of educational attainment 
among daughters in rural areas of China’ (2005:3). The above studies provide mixed 
evidence of social change with reference to gender and education, with some evidence of 
a gradual change of attitude to girls’ education, particularly in urban areas, where girls 
tend to share equal educational opportunities with boys and that the traditional view of 
‘girls without talent is of virtue’ is being challenged as a result of changing social policy 
on family planning and the promotion of suzhi education at a time of rapid urbanization 
resulting from modernization.  Major weaknesses of media accounts of a boy crisis are 
the failure to locate the question of gender and schooling within this wider local/national 
context of the inter-play between China’s socio-economic development, modernisation 
and social policy development over the last 50 years and an understanding of the impact 
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of these changes on the tensions within contemporary society’s cultural values, such as 
Confusion tradition on gender relations, as lived out in schools. 
 
So far, we have suggested that media accounts assume the discourse of a boy crisis is a 
global phenomenon and in response, we critically have explored local (national) 
meanings within a contemporary Chinese context.  In the next sections of the article we 
wish to illustrate in more detail the limitations of these media descriptive accounts, 
arguing that currently the discourse of the boy crisis can be read as a way of attempting to 
re-inscribe the earlier discourse of the boy preference, that in turn is discursively linked to 
nation building at a time of globally-inflected socio-economic transformations.   
 
 
The boy crisis – a national crisis: the (de)masculinization of education and the re-
inscription of the boy preference  
 
 
Media discourses articulated from a position of institutional privilege tend to reflect 
hegemonic positions that make claims of normative outcomes (Matheson, 2005). The 
power of such media discourses needs to be challenged by a critical media analyst in 
order to expose both the privileged as well as the subordinated subjectivities inscribed in 
these discourses (Richardson, 2006). The role of discourse analysis as a methodology is 
to denaturalise taken for granted or common-sense appeals by the powerful through their 
use of media discourses and to disrupt the relationship between the media industries and 
the state apparatus. In the process of discourse analysis, key arenas of influence and 
exercise of power are identified by the critical researcher through her knowledge of and 
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engagement with the debate and the analysis itself will be carried out on a sample of texts 
that are considered both representative and impactful.  National media outlets in present 
day China, especially the English language media, are closely aligned with and reflective 
of government policies. The hegemonic role of state authority is clear in terms of 
regulation, ownership or content production of strategic media sectors (Lagerkvist, 2010) 
so we have selected a range of texts from media outlets we believe that reflect current 
government policies and which have significant uptake internally as well as presenting a 
crystallised version of these policies towards the outside world.   
 
We have drawn upon a selection of texts from Xinhua News, People.cn, QQ web and 
China Daily, using keywords, including ‘boy crisis’ and ‘boys’ education’ in Chinese for 
our search in response to the media discourse of a boy crisis within Chinese society.  The 
reason for choosing the commentaries from the above media platforms is due to their 
potential size and reach of readership and the range of ways that they address this issue. 
For example, Xinhua news agency and people.cn are among the largest state owned 
media organization in China. QQ is one of the most popular websites that is popular for 
its social media app QQ and Weibo (micro blog), and the China Daily is a state-owned 
English language media organization targeting its English speaking readers.  The scale of 
the debates has been overwhelming. For example, a major website has dedicated a theme 
and forum for the discussion of a boy crisis; the QQ website has set up a forum3 on ‘Save 
the boys: Does Chinese ways of education produce a boy crisis?’ With reference to the 
methodological approach underpinning our engagement with the selected media texts, the 
choice of a limited number of articles is in accordance with the practices of discourse 
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analysis, especially as we consider that the media outlets that have produced these texts 
have a particular impact due to their close alignment to authoritative segments of the 
Chinese state. English language media in China tends to reflect very closely government 
thinking of the day through careful filtering of content. The same content is reflected, 
sooner or later, in various other media outlets in the country. Using discourse analysis 
methodology we do not make claims for a comprehensive and fully representative picture 
of the Chinese media landscape, but we feel confident that the chosen texts are both 
authoritative and impactful. We accept that other competing discourses are present in the 
public sphere, but their impact or potential alignment with government thinking might be 
more difficult to substantiate. 
 
In summary, there are four key aspects that are seen as constituting a boy crisis that are 
circulating in the public domain, as follows: (1) boys’ academic performance are falling 
behind girls; (2) the qualities of boys’ bodily health are not as good as they used to be; (3) 
boys’ psychological state is a concern as more boys than girls are seeking help; (4) boys’ 
ability at social adaptation is limited, leading more of them to become involved in 
violence and crime4. The media discourse has constantly highlighted selective statistics, 
such as, those outlining that girls are outnumbering boys in higher education to 
emphasise the problem (see Saving the Boys, Sun et al., 2010).  Other discussions include 
the emerging ‘feminine’ patterns of boys’ behaviour and the claim that the feminization 
of teachers (Fu, 2000) is contributing to a boy crisis, with a lack of boys’ male role 
models within schools due to the lack of male teachers.	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In response, it is important to note, that the public discourse of a boy crisis is located 
within a broader educational debate, that of the student-centred curriculum reform, 
focusing on ‘education for quality’, and aiming to shift away from an exam-oriented 
approach.  This shift has opened up a wider discussion about what should be included in 
suzhi jiaoyu (education for quality) and whether such a shift has transformed student 
experiences as well as the delivery of positive outcomes.  A particular issue in this 
transition between systems is that the measurement has traditionally primarily relied on 
examination results and academic performance.  According to Zhang (2013: 28), 
academic performance in relation to examination results continues to be the key metric to 
measure ‘suzhi’.  This has been illustrated in the high profile media coverage of China’s 
Gao Kao (college entrance examination), which tends to represent a touchstone of 
individual and national academic success as an indicator of future economic prosperity.  
In summary, as exemplified in the following media headlines, China is projected as 
facing a potential national crisis as a result of a boy crisis made manifest in their relative 
poor academic performance compared to that of girls (our emphasis added).  
 
‘Boy crisis is a problem of overall importance and trend. Falling behind girls for a 
extended period of time will generate the feeling of inferiority and revolt. This will cause 
confusion regarding gender difference. It will affect the development of the whole 
society’ (Xinhua News, 2015)5  
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‘Wang Ronghua, director of the Shanghai Education Development Foundation, has long 
maintained that the underperformance of boys in schools will negatively affect scientific 
and technological innovation in China.’ (China Daily, 2012)6 
 
In the above comments, contemporary boys’ identities are imagined not simply in terms 
of individual gender deficit but simultaneously highlight an association between failing 
boys and gender (masculine) processes involved in an assumed major threat to the 
nation’s science and technological innovation. In turn, the cultural construction of a boy 
crisis illustrated through the over-gendering of boys’ academic underachievement is 
linked to a wider anxiety about the nation’s perceived international standing in terms of 
global achievement/under-achievement – the ‘underperformance of boys in schools will 
negatively affect scientific and technological innovation in China’.  This argument 
evokes memories of specific historical periods, in which China was represented as a weak 
nation.  For example, during the late imperial Qing Dynasty, especially after being 
defeated in the Sino-Japanese War, 1894-95, China was labelled as the ‘Sick Man of East 
Asia’ (Dong Ya Bing Fu) (Hu, 2013). 
 
Within this context, the representation of a boy crisis and the accompanying feminization 
of education are made sense of in terms of challenging the public narratives about 
projecting a strong national image, both internally and globally, emerging from the late 
1970s economic reform. The power relationship in terms of the dichotomy of ‘the west 
and the rest’ has been internalized within the modern ideology of China’s planned 
progress for its future position on the global stage, with nation building and physicality as 
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central in China’s modernization process. According to Xu (2006: 92), ‘In the process of 
new nation building, they were endowed with a nationalist mission to transform the ‘sick 
man of East Asia’ (Dong Ya Bing Fu) into a strong and modern nation respected by the 
world. The link between sport, the military, and national salvation has persisted even 
until today.’  This resonates with Zheng’s recent study on the media ‘phenomenon of fake 
women’ (伪娘) (Zheng, 2015:348), which highlights that ‘effeminate men are considered 
a peril to the security of the nation because it reflects powerlessness, inferiority, 
feminized passivity, and social deterioration, reminiscent of the colonial past when China 
was defeated by the colonizing West and plagued by its image as the “sick man” of East 
Asia’ (2015:349). 
We suggest in this paper that the media anxiety about the development of school boys’ 
future as productive and healthy citizens contributing to the wider society illustrates that 
schooling is currently perceived as a central microcosm of the wider political aim of 
building the new nation. In so doing, the narratives regarding the responsibility of 
educating masculine boys for future nation-building and sustainable economic 
development may be read as further illustrating that education is a key masculinizing 
process.  More specifically, we suggest that the rhetorical claims of the feminization of 
classroom practice might be read as a wider political intervention to re-masculinize 
education in preparing boys (and girls) for a future neoliberal based economy and nation.   
 
Alongside the pervasive narratives of failing boys explored above, the mainstream media 
have proposed expert advice online, suggesting gender specific strategies in order to 
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overcome the boy crisis.  Drawing upon western policy models, such media accounts 
have distracted from internal understandings of contemporary Chinese schooling, gender 
and boyhood in relation to the reconfiguration of wider gender relations at a time of 
global transformations.  Rather, in appropriating a version of boy preference, that the 
media claim has been displaced by boy crisis a reductionist appeal is made to align the 
figure of the strong embodied boy with building the strong modern nation that is now 
explored in more detail. 
 
Beyond western neoliberal discursive frameworks –the figure of the embodied boy 
and building the strong modern nation 
 
This section of the paper illustrates some examples taken from online media outlining 
strategies for educating the ideal ‘male’ citizen for the nation’s future. In so doing, we 
critique the public debate that derivatively adopts western neoliberal discursive 
frameworks as explanatory models of contemporary Chinese male students’ schooling 
experiences, which with the globalization of education has seen policy borrowing 
increase as a common social practice (Madsen, 2006; Blackmore, 2000).  Such accounts 
tend to borrow simplistic and reductive western policy discourses focusing on 
dichotomised gender attributes and the overly-psychologised individual embodied (boy) 
subject (our emphasis added).  This has resulted in a failure to ground their understanding 
within society’s socio-historical reconfiguration of gender relations and accompanying 
shifting models of boyhood and masculinity within the context of Confucian, Maoist and 
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neoliberal periods and how these are played out within historically-specific schooling 
systems. 
 
‘To educate a masculine man, it is essential to have physical training. However, 
psychological building is also crucial. Physical strength can represent a strong 
psychological condition. A strong psychological condition can support people’s whole 
life. As a boy should be strong from the inside to outside, which will enable him to have 
comprehensive masculine confidence and to be called a real masculine man.’  (China 
Daily, 2015)7   
 
‘Authorities in Shanghai are considering establishing an all-boys high school in response 
to a so-called "masculinity crisis" among male Chinese youth… The idea of a masculinity 
crisis in China has been gaining ground in recent years, with some experts citing the 
physically and emotionally weak appearance of Chinese boys as evidence of an erosion 
of masculinity.’ (China Daily, 2012)8  
 
Some on-line media commentators, such as Wang (2015)9, suggest strategies for a new 
model of educating boys, including: ‘to enable boys to have the quality of toughness and 
to challenge their limitations through military training; to cultivate boys to have the sense 
of collectiveness, the spirit of teamwork, strong willpower and physique; to develop 
courses on street dancing, debate, in order to cultivate boys’ quality to be wise and bold, 
quick in expression, collaborative in team work and to have a wide field of vision’. For 
such media commentators, a central index of masculinity in boys’ education can be 
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symbolically highlighted by locating sport and physical activities at the centre of the 
curriculum, as they believe that this curriculum restructuring will highlight a distinctive 
masculinity that is appropriate in preparing boys for their future careers.  
In these media accounts, alongside reflecting western policy discourses focussing on how 
to resolve a boy crisis, there are other influences at play here. For example, the on-line 
media commentators’ new model of educating boys resonates with an image of 
masculinity projected during the Maoist period, which was associated with the notion of 
revolution and military action, visually represented through bodily images of rural 
peasants and industrial workers.  During 1967-1978, the government set up a programme 
of ‘Shang Shan Xia Xiang’ (Go up to mountain and go down to village), in which 17 
million urban youth were sent to live, work with and, be ‘re-educated’ by peasants in 
rural areas (Zhou and Hou, 1999). They were represented as the state’s master, who 
would teach and lead the whole nation to common prosperity (Chen, 2002). Gender 
relations in terms of masculinity and femininity in the early Maoist period were 
masculinized. For example, there was ‘gender erasure’ of women, which involved the 
intersection of ‘class struggle’ and ‘masculinisation’ within which ‘women were 
pressured to dress and act like men, but not vice versa’ (Brownell and Wassertrom, 
2002:251). It was seen as ‘progress’ to be physically strong like a man, while to act like a 
woman was labelled as weak and regressive (Honig, 2002). At the same time, the 
symbolic signifier of peasants and industrial workers served to contribute to an ideal 
masculinity that was represented by peasants and industrial workers’ bodies. Central to 
the argument of the media is that the current restructuring of an ‘overly-feminised’ 
schooling closes off such historically tough masculine subjectivities that are natural to 
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boys.  
Importantly, a series of anxieties of what both boys and the current educational system 
lack are articulated in the public discourse.  At the same time, these accounts have 
emphasised the need explicitly to link curriculum, pedagogy and assessment reform to 
boys’ characteristics, in order to enhance their gender-specific way of learning. 
‘The emergence of “boy crisis” does not simply demonstrate problems of teachers, 
parents and the boys, but the problems of educating the boys. Boys’ ways of study do not 
match the current education model.  Boys have been gifted with strength, courage and 
energy. They need sport, less speaking and more physical activities. They need to learn 
through a large amount of physical and bodily activities.’ (People’s Net, 2014)10  
 
For practitioners, such comments often appear as a practical common-sense response to 
everyday classroom problems with under-achieving boys.  However, from a critical 
educational perspective, these comments can have an unintended effect of essentializing 
boys’ assumed ‘natural’ characteristics (Liu, 2006). For example, such emphasis on boys’ 
physical strength and capability, as we have highlighted in the text, tends to re-inscribe a 
normative binary division between boys and girls that is simplistically read off as 
associated meanings of young educational masculinities and femininities that are and 
should be lived out in the classroom.  At the same time, notions of being tough and 
physically capable are central characteristics required for the development of the 
imagined future nation, in which heteronormative attributes have been highlighted in 
media commentary on how to educate boys in China.  For example, the following news 
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headline illustrates how simplistic heternormative assumptions inform the discourse of a 
boy crisis and prescribes accompanying strategies in developing a new educational 
model. 
 
‘On the morning of 4th June, more than 30 school boys stood in a multi-functional room 
of Qinling Road primary school in Zhengzhou City, holding their heads high and loudly 
read the ‘Masculine Men Declaration’:  I am a masculine man, my body is as hard as 
iron…I am a masculine man, a real “ye men” ’ (Xinhua News, 2010) 11 
 
The notion ‘ye men’ is translated as macho men, entailing ‘non-feminine’ and 
heterosexual characteristics, in terms of psychological attitudes and behaviours.  It 
traditionally refers to a representation of masculinity that is associated with men from the 
northern region of China, though recent research within other wider Chinese contexts 
have identified these characteristics as being promoted within education (see Chan, 2005; 
Yang, 2014).  For example, Chan’s (2005:75) study acknowledges the qualities of 
‘individuality, self-reliance, aggression, competitiveness, instrumentality, entrepreneurial 
orientation, rationality, and the ability to live with pressures’ in Hong Kong’s schooling 
processes. The above extract illustrates that a ‘proper boy’ should be trained to become a 
heterosexual adult man. Interestingly, such promotion of developing a macho man may 
be seen as a way of privileging specific western-based versions of white middle class 
heterosexual masculinity that unintendedly disconnect from Chinese historical 
understandings of gender relations.   
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In shifting beyond a western neoliberal perspective, it is also important to engage 
critically with the claim of the feminization of education that primarily and exclusively 
focuses on individual embodied (boy) subjects (Mac an Ghaill and Haywood, 2013).  
Within conditions of a globally-inflected regulatory regime, outlined above, we might 
begin with locating this reductive discussion about gender and education within the 
Chinese local cultural system and its attendant values (see Connell, 1998). Song and Hird 
(2013) suggest a transformation of the representation of Chinese manhood in light of the 
discourse of the ‘crisis of masculinity’ in the post-Mao era. They maintain that ‘the 
Chinese “crisis of masculinity” in the post-Mao era goes hand in hand with economic 
reform and opening up to the outside world and these changes have swept away both the 
Confucian and Maoist models of manhood’ (p. 8).  
 
Hence, in exploring Chinese institutions, such as schools, it is important to address the 
continuing impact of Confucian gender ideology and how it plays out within 
contemporary society. Although the notion of ‘nan zi qi gai’ 男子气概 (masculinity in 
Chinese) is widely circulated across the media in relation to the boy crisis, there is little 
mention of what it means in a contemporary Chinese context.  Louie conceptualizes the 
ideal types of traditional Chinese masculinities: ‘wu’ masculinity and ‘wen’ masculinity, 
as well as the divisions of ‘yin’ and ‘yang’ (see Louie, 2002, 2015; Song, 2004).  In 
theorizing Chinese masculinities, Louie (2002: 16) suggests that ‘ideal masculinity can be 
either wen or wu but is at its height when both are present to a high degree’. For example, 
wen is associated with the cultural, intellectual, civil and non-physical, while wu is 
associated with the martial, military and physical. Ideals of masculinity and femininity 
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are at the same time subsumed within Confucian social relations of the family and other 
social institutions within which men are ascribed a dominant position (Louie, 2002:10).  
Paradoxically, Zheng (2007:433) acknowledges that a ‘traditional sense of identity did 
not glorify physical prowess’.  This means the emphasis on the body and physical 
capability does not necessarily carry prominent masculine meanings. In exploring 
contemporary understandings of educational gender arrangements, such nuanced and 
complex conceptions of (young) manhood and masculinity (and we might add boyhood) 
make a highly ironic contrast to media rhetorical claims of the urgency of the patriotic 
duty to save the next generation of boys in crisis, that is based on historical amnesia about 
Chinese cultural politics while drawing upon neoliberal western policy discourses. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper set out to make a research intervention into public discussion about 
perceptions about changing gender relations in light of the neoliberal modernization 
project in China since the late 1970s.  Our focused intervention explaining the complexity 
of the discursive shift involving notions of the boy preference and the boy crisis and in 
turn the strategic move to use this public discussion to make a discursive link between the 
strong embodied boy and building the strong modern nation within a school context can 
be read as a microcosm of a wider socio-political tension within a globally inflected 
modernization project adapting to local traditional (Confucian) values.  Future 
sociological work, in exploring the reconfiguration of (public) institutionally-based 
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gender relations and accompanying concepts of boyhood, girlhood, masculinities and 
femininities might draw upon local (national/regional) and international studies in 
highlighting the potential creative interplay across geo-political spaces, in addressing how 
this modernity-tradition couplet is culturally played out within specific institutions, such 
as schools. 
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